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SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND STRIKING
TEACHERS: THE
HORTONVILLE CASE
by Michael Fedock

There was a time in America when life
was more simple than it is today. People
conducted their affairs in a personal and
direct manner and the authority of governmental bodies was not challenged
with the frequency that it is today. With
the passage of time and the tremendous

growth of society, this apparent simplicity has disappeared. As a society we
have responded to this change by creating a bureaucracy and proliferating the
many agencies which comprise it.
Administrative law involves the creation and operation of administrative
agencies, as well as the degree of control
exercised over them by the courts.
Whenever a governmental administrative agency exercises a judicial or quasijudicial power, it must comply with the
requirements of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
standard of due process requires that the
liberty or property of the citizen be
protected by basic elements of fair play
in administrative proceedings. This is
true even though the procedure of administrative agencies is usually not as
formal and strict as that of the courts.
Among the specific due process guarantees to which the citizen is entitled when

coming before an administrative agency
is the right to an unbiased and impartial
decision maker. Withrow v. Larkin, 421
U.S. 35 (1975); In re Murchison, 349
U.S. 133 (1955).
Many decisions have addressed the
issue of what constitutes bias on the part
of the decision maker and under what
circumstances bias disqualifies a decision maker. The recent case of Hortonville School District No.1 v. Hortonville
Educ. Ass'n, 96 S.Ct. 2308 (1976),
provides a new look at the question of
bias. The petitioners in Hortonville were
a Wisconsin common school district, the
school board, its elected part-time
members, and its agents. The teachers in
the school district were represented by
the respondent Hortonville Education
Association, an affiliate of both the
largest statewide teachers' labor union

and the National Education Association.
On March 18, 1974, the teachers
within the school district went on strike
over the terms of the 1974-75 collective
bargaining agreement which was to take
effect in the fall of 1974. Consequently,
schools were forced to close. On both
March 20 and 23, 1974, the superintendent of the schools invited the teachers
to return to work. While several teachers
did return at that time, most remained on
strike.
On March 29, 1974, the school board
began to schedule hearings to determine
whether the teachers were, in fact, striking as alleged by the superintendent. Individual hearings were planned pursuant to notices sent to each teacher, informing him that he was being charged
with striking in violation of both the law

and his contract. The teachers were informed that if these charges were proven
true, their employment could be terminated. Ultimately, upon the request of
the teachers, a mass hearing was held.
Counsel for the teachers objected to
the board's role as a decision maker because of its involvement in the management of the school district and its involvement in the labor dispute which
formed the basis for the hearing. Thus
counsel for the teachers requested that
an "impartial third party" act as decision
maker. The request was denied and the
hearing proceeded. The teachers' attorney made an offer of proof relating to
prior bargaining between the parties, but
did not deny that the teachers were, in
fact, striking. The board rejected the
offer of proof on the grounds of immateriality. At the close of the hearing, the
board found that the teachers were striking illegally and resolved to terminate the
employment contracts of those teachers
involved and to hire replacement
teachers. The schools reopened on April
8,1974.
On April 4, 1974, the teachers association filed a class action suit, as well as a
show cause order seeking temporary
and permanent injunctions to enjoin the
board from hiring replacement teachers.
The association did not ask that the terminated teachers be reinstated, but did
ask that the terminations be set aside.
The association also attempted to enjoin
the board from hiring replacement
teachers until such time as the discharged teachers had been afforded a
"full and fair hearing".
The Wisconsin Circuit Court denied
the association's request for a temporary
restraining order and granted the
board's motion for summary judgment
on all issued involving the federal due
process claim. The teachers association
appealed this decision to the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, which found that the
board did have the power to discharge
the striking teachers and decided all state
law questions in favor of the board. The
Court also upheld Wisconsin's prohibition of public employee strikes against
an equal protection claim. Hortonville
Edue. Ass'n v. Hortonville Joint School
Dist. No.1, 66 Wis. 2d 469,487, 225
N.W.2d 658,667 (1975).

The court then turned to the respondents' federal due process claim and
narrowed the issue to whether there was
the lack of an impartial decision maker.
The court held that the respondents
were denied due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Relying on
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972), the court concluded that even in
cases in which the facts are undisputed,
an unbiased decision maker is essential.
66 Wis. 2d at 493, 225 N. W. 2d at 671.
The court added: "This is not to suggest,
of course, that the board members were
anything but dedicated public servants,
trying to provide the district with quality
education while still keeping within its
limited budget." Id. at 494,225 N.w.2d
at 671. There was never any allegation
or finding of a personal or pecuniary bias
on the part of the board. Nevertheless,
the court held that' 'the board was not an
impartial decision maker in a constitutional sense ... " Id. The court's decision
was limited to this federal procedural
issue and did not hold that plaintiffs were
unreasonably discharged. The court
then directed that the teachers could
bring an action for de novo review of the
board's decision. Id. at 498,225 N. W.2d
at 673. Both parties moved for a rehearing and both motions were denied. The
board then filed application for the issuance of a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States, which
granted certiorari. Hortonville Joint
School Dist. No.1 v. Hortonville Edue.
Ass'n, 96 S.Ct. 34 (1975).
The Supreme Court noted that the
teachers' argument rested on two contentions: first, that the board, because it
headed the school district, had some
personal or official stake in the decision
of whether the teachers should be dismissed; and second, that the board had
manifested bitterness toward the
teachers because the teachers had
criticized the board during the strike. The
Court found that (1) the teachers had
not shown that the board had the kind of
personal or financial stake in the decision
that might create a conflict of interest and
(2) there was nothing in the record to
support charges of personal animosity.
The only other factor utilized by the
teachers to support their claim of bias
was the fact that the board was involved

in the negotiations that preceded and
precipitated the discharges. The Wisconsin Supreme Court had held that this
factor, without more, disqualified the
board. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected this holding. "Mere familiarity
with the facts of a case gained by an
agency in the performance of its statutory role does not, however, disqualify a
decision maker." 96 S.Ct. at 2314. Ultimately the Court held:
Respondents have failed to demonstrate that the decision to terminate
their employment was infected by the
sort of bias that we have held to disqualify other decision makers as a
matter of federal due process. A showing that the Board was 'involved' in
the events preceding this decision, in
light of the important interest in leaving with the Board the power given by
the state legislature, is not enough to
overcome the presumption of honesty
and integrity in policymakers with decision making power. Cf. Withrow v.
Larkin, 421 U.S. 35,47 (1975). Accordingly, we hold that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not guarantee respondents that the decision to terminate their employment would be
made or reviewed by a body other
than the School Board. Id. at 2316.
Maryland decisions are in accord with
this enunciation by the Supreme Court.
In Pressman v. Barnes, 209 Md. 544,
121 A.2d 816 (1955), the Maryland
Court of Appeals noted that "the
modern tendency of the courts is toward
greater liberality in permitting grants of
discretion to administrative officials in
order to facilitate the administration of
the laws as the complexity of governmental and economic conditions increases." Id. at 555, 121 A.2d at 822.
Also in accord with the ruling of the
high Court is the principle, long recognized in Maryland, that administrative
decisions carry with them a presumption
of validity and will only be disturbed on
review if it can be shown, on the record,
that there was not substantial evidence
to support the findings. DickinsonTidewater, Inc. v. Supervisor of Assessments of Anne Arundel County, 273
Md. 245,329 A.2d 18 (1974); Heaps v.
Cobb, 185 Md. 372, 45A.2d 73 (1945).
Therefore, disqualifying bias does not
exist in a decision maker merely because
that decision maker is closely connected

with the subject matter of his decision.
Bias will not be dealt with as a matter of
speculation to be drawn from mere circumstances in which the decision maker
might find himself. Bias must be shown
to exist from the facts and must be of
such personal or pecuniary nature as
would render the decision maker disqualified. This conclusion is in agreement with the classic statement of the
United States Court of Appeals in In re
Linahan, 138 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1943),

that "[i]f, however, 'bias' and 'partiality'
be defined to mean the total absence of
pre-conceptions in the mind of the
judge, then no one has ever had a fair
trial and no one ever will .... In addition
to those acquired social value judgments, every judge, however, unavoidably has many idiosyncratic 'learnings of
the mind', uniquely personal prejudices,
which may interfere with his fairness at a
trial. ... Frankly, to recognize the existence of such prejudices is the part of

wisdom. The conscientious judge will, as
far as possible, make himself aware of his
biases of this character, and, by that very
self knowledge, nullify their effect." Id. at
651-52.
Such principles are necessary in order
to maintain the balance between the individual's right to due process and the
interest of the state in seeing to it that its
agencies administer certain aspects of
government with a maximum of effectiveness.

by Peter H. Meyers
(Reprinted from The Leaflet,
vol. 5, issue 3.)

SEARCH AND
SEIZURE PROTECTIONS
WEAKENED
The U.S. Supreme Court ended its
1975-76 Term in July with five separate
decisions Significantly weakening the
Fourth Amendment's protection against
unreasonable search and seizure. The
Court:
• Ruled 5-4 that police officers can
constitutionally search the unlocked
glove compartment of a car impounded
for traffic Violations, as part of a routine
"inventory" of the car's contents. In this
case, police had found a bag of
marijuana in the glove compartment,
and the defendant had been convicted
of possession. The Court's opinion appears to leave open the question of
whether a search of a locked glove compartment or trunk as part of a routine
"inventory" would also be constitutional. South Dakota v. Opperman, 44
U.S.L.W 5294 (July 6, 1976).
• Ruled 7-2 that a heroin suspect observed by police as she stood in the open
doorway of her home could be arrested
without a warrant because the doorway
of a house which is open to public view
from the street is equivalent to any other
"public place". US. v. Santana, 44
U.S.L.W 4970 (June 25, 1976). The
Court held earlier this Term that a warrantless arrest in a public place upon
probable cause would not violate the
Fourth Amendment.
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• Ruled 5-3 that the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule does not forbid
the use in a federal civil proceeding of
evidence seized unconstitutionally, but
in good faith, by state police officers.
US. v. Janis, 44 U.S.L. W. 5303 (July 6,
1976). The Court specifically left open
the questions of whether evidence
seized unconstitutionally by state police
could be used in a state civil proceeding,
and whether evidence seized unconstitutionally by federal police could be used
in a federal civil proceeding.
• Ruled 6-3 that "where the State
has provided an opportunity for full and
fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment
claim, a state prisoner may not be
granted federal habeas corpus relief on
the ground that evidence obtained in an
unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial." Stone v. Powell,

44 U.S.L.W. 5313 (July 6,1976). This
decision means that, except in very rare
instances, only the Supreme Court, and
not the lower federal courts, can consider whether evidence obtained in an
unconstitutional search was introduced
in a state trial. With the Supreme Court's
heavy caseload, it will hear only a small
number of these cases.
• Ruled 7-2 that Border Patrol officials at fixed checkpoints on U.S. highways near international borders may
stop a vehicle and question its occupants
about their right to be in this country,
even without a reasonable suspicion that
the vehicle contains illegal aliens. US. v.
Martinez-Fuerte, U.S.L.W 5336 (July 6,
1976). Last Term, the Court held that
roving border patrols could not stop a
vehicle without a reasonable suspicion
that it contained illegal aliens.

